Security of EPR-based Quantum Key Distribution

We propose a proof of the security of EPR-based quantum key distribution against enemies with unlimited computational power. The proof holds for a protocol using interactive error-reconciliation scheme. We assume in this paper that the legitimate parties receive a given number of single photon signa...

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Published in:arXiv.org 2000-08
Main Author: Inamori, Hitoshi
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Measuring instruments
Quantum cryptography
Security
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description We propose a proof of the security of EPR-based quantum key distribution against enemies with unlimited computational power. The proof holds for a protocol using interactive error-reconciliation scheme. We assume in this paper that the legitimate parties receive a given number of single photon signals and that their measurement devices are perfect.
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subjects Measuring instruments
Quantum cryptography
Security
title Security of EPR-based Quantum Key Distribution
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