Evolutionary, Mean-Field and Pressure-Resistance Game Modelling of Networks Security

The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended model of interaction of large number of indistinguishable small...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:arXiv.org 2018-08
Main Authors: Katsikas, Stamatios, Kolokoltsov, Vassili
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Crime
Cybersecurity
Decision making
Evolution
Game theory
Games
Inspection
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended model of interaction of large number of indistinguishable small players against a major player, with focus on the study of security and crime prevention. In this paper we introduce such a general framework for complex interaction in network structures of many players, that incorporates individual decision making inside the environment (the mean-field game component), binary interaction (the evolutionary game component), and the interference of a principal player (the pressure-resistance game component). To perform concrete calculations with this overall complicated model we work in three basic asymptotic regimes; fast execution of personal decisions, small rates of binary interactions, and small payoff discounting in time. By this approach we construct a class of solutions having the so-called turnpike property.
ISSN:2331-8422
DOI:10.48550/arxiv.1808.06409