Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions

We estimate monetary policy reaction functions which describe how individual FOMC members' monetary policy preferences vary according to their professional and career backgrounds, their appointment status (as a Governor or Bank President), and their partisan or district Reserve Bank affiliation...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economics and business 1995-05, Vol.47 (2), p.113-136
Main Authors: Chappell, Henry W., Havrilesky, Thomas M., McGregor, Rob Roy
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Central banks
Economic reform
Economic theory
Federal Reserve monetary policy
Monetary policy
Policy making
Political behavior
Statistical analysis
Studies
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Summary:We estimate monetary policy reaction functions which describe how individual FOMC members' monetary policy preferences vary according to their professional and career backgrounds, their appointment status (as a Governor or Bank President), and their partisan or district Reserve Bank affiliations. Based on our results, we present examples illustrating how proposed changes in the composition of the FOMC might be evaluated.
ISSN:0148-6195
1879-1735
DOI:10.1016/0148-6195(94)00041-B