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Toward Supply Chain Sustainability: Governance and Implementation of Joint Sustainability Development
The extant sustainability literature has argued that supply chain (SC) members can gain both financial and operational benefits from a joint sustainability development (JSD) effort. However, no guidance has been provided on how SC members could collaborate on their sustainability development efforts...
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Published in: | Sustainability 2018-05, Vol.10 (5), p.1658 |
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creator | Xu, Yongmei Yoon, Jiho Kim, Myung Sheu, Chwen |
description | The extant sustainability literature has argued that supply chain (SC) members can gain both financial and operational benefits from a joint sustainability development (JSD) effort. However, no guidance has been provided on how SC members could collaborate on their sustainability development efforts to achieve the intended economic performance. This study addressed this research gap by proposing different contractual governances, based on a game-theoretic approach, for both manufacturer and retailer to better engage in JSD. Specifically, multiple JSD contractual arrangements regarding profit and associated cost sharing between manufacturers and retailers were defined and evaluated. Our analyses show that the manufacturer behaves opportunistically when the impact of a retailer’s effort on consumer demand is low. In other words, the retailer increases its sustainability effort, but not the manufacturer. However, such opportunistic behavior can be removed under a revenue sharing arrangement. That is, the manufacturer becomes cooperative with the retailer, and both retailer and manufacturer increase their JSD efforts. Several numerical experiments were conducted to assess the effectiveness of various revenue sharing arrangements (no sharing, partial profit sharing, and total profit sharing) in devising and implementing a mutually beneficial JSD program. Accordingly, several guidelines for the SC JSD implementation are provided. |
doi_str_mv | 10.3390/su10051658 |
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subjects | Game theory R&D Research & development Revenue Revenue sharing Supply chain sustainability Supply chains Sustainability Sustainable development |
title | Toward Supply Chain Sustainability: Governance and Implementation of Joint Sustainability Development |
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