Sensory holism and functionalism

I defend the possibility of a functional account of the intrinsic qualities of sensory experience against the claim that functional characterization can only describe such qualities to the level of isomorphism of relational structures on those qualities. A form sensory holism might be true concernin...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Behavioral and brain sciences 1999-12, Vol.22 (6), p.972-973
Main Author: Tolliver, Joseph Thomas
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Brain
Open Peer Commentary
Palmer: Color and consciousness
Philosophy
Sensory perception
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Summary:I defend the possibility of a functional account of the intrinsic qualities of sensory experience against the claim that functional characterization can only describe such qualities to the level of isomorphism of relational structures on those qualities. A form sensory holism might be true concerning the phenomenal, and this holism would account for some antifunctionalist intuition evoked by inverted spectrum and absent qualia arguments. Sensory holism is compatible with the correctness of functionalism about the phenomenal.
ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X99522218