The contents of consciousness during sleep: Some theoretical problems

The approach of Hobson et al. is limited to the description of global states of consciousness, although more detailed analyses of the specific contents of consciousness would also be required. Furthermore, their account of the mind-brain relationship remains obscure. Nielsen's discussion suffer...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Behavioral and brain sciences 2000-12, Vol.23 (6), p.995-996
Main Author: Revonsuo, Antti
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Brain
Consciousness
Psychology
Sleep
Theory
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Summary:The approach of Hobson et al. is limited to the description of global states of consciousness, although more detailed analyses of the specific contents of consciousness would also be required. Furthermore, their account of the mind-brain relationship remains obscure. Nielsen's discussion suffers from conceptual and definitional unclarity. Mentation during sleep could be clarified by reconceptualizing it as an issue about the contents of consciousness. Vertes & Eastman do not consider the types of memory (emotional) and learning (implicit) that are relevant during REM sleep, and therefore dismiss on inadequate grounds the possibility of memory functions associated with REM sleep. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Vertes & Eastman]
ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X00814028