Husserl’s covert critique of Kant in the sixth book of Logical Investigations

• Published in: Continental philosophy review 2019-03, Vol.52 (1), p.15-33
• Main Author: van Mazijk, Corijn
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Consciousness; Education; Husserl, Edmund (1859-1938); Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804); Knowledge; Phenomenology; Philosophy; Philosophy of Man; Philosophy of mind; Political Philosophy; Transcendentalism
• ISSN: 1387-2842; 1573-1103
• DOI: 10.1007/s11007-018-9451-y

In the final book of Logical Investigations from 1901, Husserl develops a theory of knowledge based on the intentional structure of consciousness. While there is some textual evidence that Husserl considered this to entail a critique of Kantian philosophy, he did not elaborate substantially on this. This paper reconstructs the covert critique of Kant’s theory of knowledge which LI contains. With respect to Kant, I discuss three core aspects of his theory of knowledge which, as Husserl’s reflections on Kant indicate, Husserl was familiar with. These are (i) the cooperation of two faculties for the justification of beliefs; (ii) the concept of a priori structures of knowledge Kant operated with; and (iii) the delivered transcendental proof of these structures. Regarding Logical Investigations , I first briefly outline the intentional structure of consciousness as presented in the fifth book and then turn to the theory of knowledge in the sixth book. I then clarify, partially on the basis of manuscripts and lecture notes, the covert critique of the three core aspects of Kant’s theory which the sixth book contains.