La prima inferenza. L'abduzione di C.S. Peirce fra scienza e diritto. (The First Inference. The Abduction of C.S. Peirce between Science and Law)

In this sense, abduction is not IBE (ordinary or extraordinary, because IBE theorists require that IBE accounts for all the range of non-deductive inference), but the best hypothesis to put to test. [...] it is supposed that IBE provides inductive proofs (this is why it has been used as an argument...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 2008-10, Vol.44 (4), p.734-739
Main Author: Nino, Douglas
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Inference
Law
Logic
Nonfiction
Peirce, Charles Sanders (1839-1914)
Philosophy
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Summary:In this sense, abduction is not IBE (ordinary or extraordinary, because IBE theorists require that IBE accounts for all the range of non-deductive inference), but the best hypothesis to put to test. [...] it is supposed that IBE provides inductive proofs (this is why it has been used as an argument in favor of scientific realism), and Tuzet accepts that abductions do not prove (p. 155); moreover, Tuzet says that both loveliest and likeliest variations of IBE are versions of qualitative induction (p. 181n16).
ISSN:0009-1774
1558-9587