Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications

We study strategic issues in the Gale-Shapley stable marriage model. In the first part of the paper, we derive the optimal cheating strategy and show that it is not always possible for a woman to recover her women-optimal stable partner from the men-optimal stable matching mechanism when she can onl...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Management science 2001-09, Vol.47 (9), p.1252-1267
Main Authors: Teo, Chung-Piaw, Sethuraman, Jay, Tan, Wee-Peng
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Algorithms
Business studies
Cheating
Deceit
Education
Elementary school students
Elementary schools
Gale-Shapley Algorithm
High school students
Interpersonal relations
Management science
Market mechanisms
Marriage
Men
Modeling
Preferences
School admission
Secondary school students
Secondary schools
Single status
Stable Marriage
Strategic behavior
Strategic Issues
Student Posting Exercise
Studies
Women
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Summary:We study strategic issues in the Gale-Shapley stable marriage model. In the first part of the paper, we derive the optimal cheating strategy and show that it is not always possible for a woman to recover her women-optimal stable partner from the men-optimal stable matching mechanism when she can only cheat by permuting her preferences. In fact, we show, using simulation, that the chances that a woman can benefit from cheating are slim. In the second part of the paper, we consider a two-sided matching market found in Singapore. We study the matching mechanism used by the Ministry of Education (MOE) in the placement of primary six students in secondary schools, and discuss why the current method has limited success in accommodating the preferences of the students, and the specific needs of the schools (in terms of the "mix" of admitted students). Using insights from the first part of the paper, we show that stable matching mechanisms are more appropriate in this matching market and explain why the strategic behavior of the students need not be a major concern.
ISSN:0025-1909
1526-5501
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.47.9.1252.9784