Fiscal Accountability in Gubernatorial Elections

Although significant research has been conducted on economic voting in gubernatorial elections, very few explore the impact of state fiscal conditions in these elections. The little that has been done yields conflicting results regarding the effects of state spending and found that governors are not...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:State politics & policy quarterly 2018-12, Vol.18 (4), p.395-416
Main Authors: Cummins, Jeff, Holyoke, Thomas T.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accountability
Balance of power
Election results
Elections
Expenditures
Fiscal policy
Governors
Health care policy
Political behavior
State elections
Voters
Voting
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Although significant research has been conducted on economic voting in gubernatorial elections, very few explore the impact of state fiscal conditions in these elections. The little that has been done yields conflicting results regarding the effects of state spending and found that governors are not held responsible for a state’s overall fiscal health. Our study examines the impact of spending and fiscal health on gubernatorial elections from 1982 to 2013. We find evidence that voters reward incumbent parties for fiscal health and spending growth and that unified government and stronger executive budget powers enhance fiscal accountability for these outcomes. These findings contradict previous research that suggests voters punish one or both parties for higher spending. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for the debate about the balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches.
ISSN:1532-4400
1946-1607
DOI:10.1177/1532440018792260