Improving judgement with prepaid expert advice

Decision makers (“Judges”) often make decisions after obtaining advice from an Advisor. The two parties often share a psychological “contract” about what each contributes in expertise to the decision and receives in monetary outcomes from it. In a laboratory experiment, we varied Advisor Experitise...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of behavioral decision making 2004-07, Vol.17 (3), p.173-190
Main Authors: Sniezek, Janet A., Schrah, Gunnar E., Dalal, Reeshad S.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accuracy
advice giving
Advisors
Behavior
Decision making
decision quality
Decision theory
estimation accuracy
Laboratories
Monetary incentives
monetary rewards
Prepaid services
Studies
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Summary:Decision makers (“Judges”) often make decisions after obtaining advice from an Advisor. The two parties often share a psychological “contract” about what each contributes in expertise to the decision and receives in monetary outcomes from it. In a laboratory experiment, we varied Advisor Experitise and the opportunity for monetary rewards. As expected, these manipulations influenced advice quality, advice taking, and Judge post‐advice decision quality. The main contribution of the study, however, was the manipulation of the timing of monetary rewards (before or after the advising interaction). We found, as predicted, that committing money for expert—but not novice—advice increases Judges' use of advice and their subsequent estimation accuracy. Implications for advice giving and taking are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
ISSN:0894-3257
1099-0771
DOI:10.1002/bdm.468