Do efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs increase turf war violence? a theoretical analysis

This paper models illicit drug dealers as territorial monopolists. The model shows that an increase in efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs decreases a dealer's expected monopoly returns over drug turf. Consequently, efforts to acquire drug turf through violence are reduced.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economics and finance 1999-10, Vol.23 (3), p.226-234
Main Author: Burrus, Robert T.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Drugs
Economic models
Monopolies
Studies
Violence
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Description
Summary:This paper models illicit drug dealers as territorial monopolists. The model shows that an increase in efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs decreases a dealer's expected monopoly returns over drug turf. Consequently, efforts to acquire drug turf through violence are reduced.
ISSN:1055-0925
1938-9744
DOI:10.1007/BF02757707