Illegal immigration, unemployment, and multiple destinations

We develop a multicountry model of illegal immigration with equilibrium unemployment. Two geographic cases are considered. One has two destinations adjacent to the source country while the other has just one destination country adjacent to it. In both cases, the equilibrium border control proves ins...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of regional science 2019-01, Vol.59 (1), p.118-144
Main Authors: Miyagiwa, Kaz, Sato, Yasuhiro
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Border stations
Borders
Destinations
Employment
Enforcement
Equilibrium
equilibrium unemployment
illegal immigration
Immigration
Immigration policy
immigration policy competition
job search
Labor force
multiple destinations
Undocumented immigrants
Unemployment
Welfare
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Summary:We develop a multicountry model of illegal immigration with equilibrium unemployment. Two geographic cases are considered. One has two destinations adjacent to the source country while the other has just one destination country adjacent to it. In both cases, the equilibrium border control proves insufficient compared with the joint optimum, calling for enforcement by federal authorities. Absent such authorities, delegating border control to the country with a larger native labor force can improve each destination country’s welfare. In contrast, the equilibrium internal enforcement policy is efficient, obviating enforcement by supranational authorities.
ISSN:0022-4146
1467-9787
DOI:10.1111/jors.12408