Illegal immigration, unemployment, and multiple destinations

We develop a multicountry model of illegal immigration with equilibrium unemployment. Two geographic cases are considered. One has two destinations adjacent to the source country while the other has just one destination country adjacent to it. In both cases, the equilibrium border control proves ins...

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Published in:Journal of regional science 2019-01, Vol.59 (1), p.118-144
Main Authors: Miyagiwa, Kaz, Sato, Yasuhiro
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Border stations
Borders
Destinations
Employment
Enforcement
Equilibrium
equilibrium unemployment
illegal immigration
Immigration
Immigration policy
immigration policy competition
job search
Labor force
multiple destinations
Undocumented immigrants
Unemployment
Welfare
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container_issue 1
container_start_page 118
container_title Journal of regional science
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creator Miyagiwa, Kaz
Sato, Yasuhiro
description We develop a multicountry model of illegal immigration with equilibrium unemployment. Two geographic cases are considered. One has two destinations adjacent to the source country while the other has just one destination country adjacent to it. In both cases, the equilibrium border control proves insufficient compared with the joint optimum, calling for enforcement by federal authorities. Absent such authorities, delegating border control to the country with a larger native labor force can improve each destination country’s welfare. In contrast, the equilibrium internal enforcement policy is efficient, obviating enforcement by supranational authorities.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/jors.12408
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source EconLit s plnými texty; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Wiley-Blackwell Read & Publish Collection; PAIS Index; BSC - Ebsco (Business Source Ultimate)
subjects Border stations
Borders
Destinations
Employment
Enforcement
Equilibrium
equilibrium unemployment
illegal immigration
Immigration
Immigration policy
immigration policy competition
job search
Labor force
multiple destinations
Undocumented immigrants
Unemployment
Welfare
title Illegal immigration, unemployment, and multiple destinations
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