Should a historically motivated anti-realist be a Stanfordite?

Suppose one believes that the historical record of discarded scientific theories provides good evidence against scientific realism. Should one adopt Kyle Stanford's specific version of this view, based on the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA)? I present reasons for answering this questi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2019-02, Vol.196 (2), p.535-551
Main Author: Frost-Arnold, Greg
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cognition & reasoning
Education
Epistemology
Historicism
Logic
Metaphysics
Pessimism
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Realism
S.I.: Scientific Realism
Stanford, Kyle
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Summary:Suppose one believes that the historical record of discarded scientific theories provides good evidence against scientific realism. Should one adopt Kyle Stanford's specific version of this view, based on the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA)? I present reasons for answering this question in the negative. In particular, Stanford's challenge cannot use many of the prima facie strongest pieces of historical evidence against realism, namely: (i) superseded theories whose successors were explicitly conceived, and (ii) superseded theories that were not the result of elimination-of-alternatives inferences. Attempts to accommodate (i) and (ii) within Stanford's framework are incompatible with other commitments Stanford holds, such as anti-realism being piecemeal instead of global. As separate lines of criticism, I argue that there are problems with Stanford's claim that the PUA is the most important challenge to realism, and with his view of instrumentalist theory endorsement.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-016-1050-z