Mao’s last revolution: a dictator’s loyalty–competence tradeoff

Although competent (vs mediocre) subordinates, while better contributors to dictator success, are also more prone to treason, it remains unclear empirically how (and even whether) dictators address this loyalty–competence tradeoff. To throw light on this issue, we use a biographical dataset of Chine...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice 2019-09, Vol.180 (3/4), p.469-500
Main Authors: Bai, Ying, Zhou, Titi
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Communism
Communist parties
Competence
Cultural change
Dictators
Economics
Economics and Finance
Hiring
Loyalty
Political Science
Prone
Public Finance
Purging
Subordinates
Treason
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Summary:Although competent (vs mediocre) subordinates, while better contributors to dictator success, are also more prone to treason, it remains unclear empirically how (and even whether) dictators address this loyalty–competence tradeoff. To throw light on this issue, we use a biographical dataset of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CC) members from 1945 to 1982 to investigate the tradeoff faced by Mao Zedong in selecting his senior officials. Our results suggest that during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the foundation and consolidation of the new regime lowered the payoff from subordinate competence, leading to the purging of competent CC members and their replacement by mediocre substitutes. Additional analyses of the competing mechanisms proposed by different theoretical models indicate further that capable young subordinates are more likely to be purged, possibly because they have more outside options (e.g., future hiring by the dictator’s successor) and, hence, expend less effort on loyalty.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/s11127-019-00649-9