Neoliberal environmentality and incentive-coordinated REDD+ contracts

• Published in: Land use policy 2019-02, Vol.81, p.400-407
• Main Author: Sheng, Jichuan
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Computer simulation; Contracts; Coordination; Deforestation; Degradation; Ecosystem services; Ecosystems; Emissions; Emissions control; Environmental changes; Environmental impact; Environmentality; Forest resources; Governmentality; Incentive coordination; Incentives; Interest groups; Land use; Mathematical models; Neoliberalism; Payments; REDD+ contract; Simulation
• ISSN: 0264-8377; 1873-5754
• DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.10.055

•Investor can achieve its maximum interest through incentive coordination in REDD+.•Landholders will not suffer any losses after incentive coordination in REDD+.•Incentive-coordinated contracts can improve the efforts to reduce emissions.•Landholder with better capability is more likely to improve its efforts in REDD+.•Incentive coordination is interpreted as a techne of neoliberal environmentality. The complexity and profound spatial effects of incentives in the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) contracts make them an ideal case for applying neoliberal environmentality theory, as they provide a special lens to closely observe how incentive coordination, as a techne of neoliberal environmentality, shapes individual behavior in reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation. This paper introduces some political and economic arguments related to the issue of incentive coordination in REDD+ contracts from the perspective of neoliberal environmentality. According to the efforts of landholders to reduce emissions, this paper conducts a game model of payments for ecosystem services to describe the dynamic interaction behavior between an investor and several landholders in the current REDD+ contract and an incentive-coordinated REDD+ contract. In the theoretical framework, the effects of incentive coordination on the landholders’ efforts to reduce emissions are analyzed. A numerical simulation is adopt to examine the changes in the efforts of landholders to reduce emissions and in the benefits of stakeholders under two REDD+ contracts. The results demonstrate the following: First, the investor can maximize benefits without losing the landholders’ interests via designing incentive-coordinated REDD+ contracts. Second, extra incentives can improve landholders’ efforts to reduce emissions, which contributes to achieving the goal of the REDD+ scheme. Third, landholders with stronger capabilities are more likely to reduce emissions, thus receiving more extra incentives. Incentive coordination has become a neoliberal environmentality; it can impact a landholder’s use of forest resources by changing the benefits of reducing emissions in the REDD+ scheme.