Questions and Answers: Metaphysical Explanation and the Structure of Reality

This paper develops an account of metaphysical explanation according to which metaphysical explanations are answers to what-makes-it-the-case-that questions. On this view, metaphysical explanations are not to be considered entirely objective, but are subject to epistemic constraints imposed by the c...

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Published in:Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2019, Vol.5 (1), p.98-116
Main Author: THOMPSON, NAOMI
Format: Article
Language:English
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Epistemology
Metaphysics
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description This paper develops an account of metaphysical explanation according to which metaphysical explanations are answers to what-makes-it-the-case-that questions. On this view, metaphysical explanations are not to be considered entirely objective, but are subject to epistemic constraints imposed by the context in which a relevant question is asked. The resultant account of metaphysical explanation is developed independently of any particular views about grounding. Toward the end of the paper an application of the view is proposed that takes metaphysical explanations conceived in this way to characterize reality's structure. According to this proposal, reality's structure is partly constituted by a projection of our explanatory practices onto reality.
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subjects Epistemology
Metaphysics
title Questions and Answers: Metaphysical Explanation and the Structure of Reality
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