On propositions and fineness of grain (again!)

What I plan to do in the present paper is, first, sketch the theory of propositions I defended in a recent book I coauthored with Scott Soames and Jeff Speaks.1 Second, I want to respond to a criticism of that view raised by Hanks (2015). Finally, I want to discuss some changes in my view since the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2019-04, Vol.196 (4), p.1343-1367
Main Author: King, Jeffrey C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Communication
Education
Epistemology
Literary criticism
Logic
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Proposals
Propositions
S.I.: Unity of Structured Propositions
Social philosophy
Truth
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Summary:What I plan to do in the present paper is, first, sketch the theory of propositions I defended in a recent book I coauthored with Scott Soames and Jeff Speaks.1 Second, I want to respond to a criticism of that view raised by Hanks (2015). Finally, I want to discuss some changes in my view since the publication of King et al. (2014). Before all that, let me begin by motivating my view of propositions and describing how I came to hold it.In the mid 1990s, I began thinking about the metaphysics of propositions. I became convinced that any theory of propositions worth that epithet had to provide an explanation of how/why propositions have truth conditions. In my first papers on this topic in the mid 1990’s, I made clear that I viewed explaining how/why propositions have truth conditions or represent the world as being a certain way as an important desideratum for a theory of propositions
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-016-1291-x