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Two-Period Dynamic versus Fixed-Ratio Pricing Policies under Duopoly Competition
This paper introduces a two-period, pricing policy under duopoly competition between two firms offering an identical product to consumers who are intertemporal utility maximization. Firms have equal inventories of faultlessly replaceable and perishable products. The firms adjust prices to maximize p...
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Published in: | Mathematical problems in engineering 2019-01, Vol.2019 (2019), p.1-11 |
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container_title | Mathematical problems in engineering |
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creator | Peng, Ting Tu, Yu Yang, Xi Li, Hao |
description | This paper introduces a two-period, pricing policy under duopoly competition between two firms offering an identical product to consumers who are intertemporal utility maximization. Firms have equal inventories of faultlessly replaceable and perishable products. The firms adjust prices to maximize profits and determine optimal pricing policies, choosing from dynamic pricing, fixed-ratio pricing, and elastic pricing policies. According to a duopoly competition model, the consumer is limited to a single firm visit per period. The consumer decides to purchase the product at current price from a firm and remain in the market to purchase product from the other firm in the next period or exit the market. The results offer three main conclusions. First, elastic pricing is consistent with dynamic pricing. Second, the more consumers visit the firm in the first period, the more profits the firm will make. Third, we explore the effectiveness of different pricing policies. The results show that although dynamic pricing is a more complex policy than fixed-ratio pricing, it may lead to decreased equilibrium profits when the firms sharply discounts prices and consumer rationality is unlimited. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1155/2019/6567952 |
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Firms have equal inventories of faultlessly replaceable and perishable products. The firms adjust prices to maximize profits and determine optimal pricing policies, choosing from dynamic pricing, fixed-ratio pricing, and elastic pricing policies. According to a duopoly competition model, the consumer is limited to a single firm visit per period. The consumer decides to purchase the product at current price from a firm and remain in the market to purchase product from the other firm in the next period or exit the market. The results offer three main conclusions. First, elastic pricing is consistent with dynamic pricing. Second, the more consumers visit the firm in the first period, the more profits the firm will make. Third, we explore the effectiveness of different pricing policies. The results show that although dynamic pricing is a more complex policy than fixed-ratio pricing, it may lead to decreased equilibrium profits when the firms sharply discounts prices and consumer rationality is unlimited.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1024-123X</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1563-5147</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1155/2019/6567952</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cairo, Egypt: Hindawi Publishing Corporation</publisher><subject>Competition ; Consumers ; Discounts ; Economic models ; Markets ; Mathematical problems ; Optimization ; Pricing ; Pricing policies ; Profits</subject><ispartof>Mathematical problems in engineering, 2019-01, Vol.2019 (2019), p.1-11</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2019 Hao Li et al.</rights><rights>Copyright © 2019 Hao Li et al. 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The results show that although dynamic pricing is a more complex policy than fixed-ratio pricing, it may lead to decreased equilibrium profits when the firms sharply discounts prices and consumer rationality is unlimited.</description><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Consumers</subject><subject>Discounts</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Markets</subject><subject>Mathematical problems</subject><subject>Optimization</subject><subject>Pricing</subject><subject>Pricing policies</subject><subject>Profits</subject><issn>1024-123X</issn><issn>1563-5147</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2019</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>PIMPY</sourceid><recordid>eNqF0MFLwzAUBvAgCs7pzbMUPGpdXtIkzVE2p8LAIhO8laZJNWNratI699_b0YFHT-87_PgefAhdAr4DYGxCMMgJZ1xIRo7QCBinMYNEHPcZkyQGQt9P0VkIK4wJMEhHKFtuXZwZb52OZru62Ngy-jY-dCGa2x-j49eitS7KvC1t_RFlbt0HE6Ku1sZHs841br2Lpm7TmNb2sj5HJ1WxDubicMfobf6wnD7Fi5fH5-n9Ii4px22slCg5FlxypkCqSmpdghRUKUMESRnnCa6kZCVornRRMZ2IFIwGxUrFC0rH6Hrobbz76kxo85XrfN2_zAnBSUqpANmr20GV3oXgTZU33m4Kv8sB5_vN8v1m-WGznt8M_NPWutja__TVoE1vTFX8aZCcE6C_pcJ1ig</recordid><startdate>20190101</startdate><enddate>20190101</enddate><creator>Peng, Ting</creator><creator>Tu, Yu</creator><creator>Yang, Xi</creator><creator>Li, Hao</creator><general>Hindawi Publishing Corporation</general><general>Hindawi</general><general>Hindawi Limited</general><scope>ADJCN</scope><scope>AHFXO</scope><scope>RHU</scope><scope>RHW</scope><scope>RHX</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TB</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>8FE</scope><scope>8FG</scope><scope>ABJCF</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ARAPS</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BGLVJ</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>CWDGH</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><scope>K7-</scope><scope>KR7</scope><scope>L6V</scope><scope>M7S</scope><scope>P5Z</scope><scope>P62</scope><scope>PIMPY</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PTHSS</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9634-2691</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20190101</creationdate><title>Two-Period Dynamic versus Fixed-Ratio Pricing Policies under Duopoly Competition</title><author>Peng, Ting ; Tu, Yu ; Yang, Xi ; Li, Hao</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-bb7c6076965b19bf9ddc1973bbe272856640f995c1d6bdaf5d4781ed1b5cb6a33</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2019</creationdate><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Consumers</topic><topic>Discounts</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Markets</topic><topic>Mathematical problems</topic><topic>Optimization</topic><topic>Pricing</topic><topic>Pricing policies</topic><topic>Profits</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Peng, Ting</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tu, Yu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yang, Xi</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Li, Hao</creatorcontrib><collection>الدوريات العلمية والإحصائية - e-Marefa Academic and Statistical Periodicals</collection><collection>معرفة - المحتوى العربي الأكاديمي المتكامل - e-Marefa Academic Complete</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Complete</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Subscription Journals</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Open Access</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Mechanical & Transportation Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest SciTech Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Technology Collection</collection><collection>Materials Science & Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>Middle East & Africa Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Computer Science Collection</collection><collection>Computer Science Database</collection><collection>Civil Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Collection</collection><collection>Engineering Database</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Collection</collection><collection>Publicly Available Content Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>Engineering Collection</collection><jtitle>Mathematical problems in engineering</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Peng, Ting</au><au>Tu, Yu</au><au>Yang, Xi</au><au>Li, Hao</au><au>Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav</au><au>Vyacheslav Kalashnikov</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Two-Period Dynamic versus Fixed-Ratio Pricing Policies under Duopoly Competition</atitle><jtitle>Mathematical problems in engineering</jtitle><date>2019-01-01</date><risdate>2019</risdate><volume>2019</volume><issue>2019</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>11</epage><pages>1-11</pages><issn>1024-123X</issn><eissn>1563-5147</eissn><abstract>This paper introduces a two-period, pricing policy under duopoly competition between two firms offering an identical product to consumers who are intertemporal utility maximization. Firms have equal inventories of faultlessly replaceable and perishable products. The firms adjust prices to maximize profits and determine optimal pricing policies, choosing from dynamic pricing, fixed-ratio pricing, and elastic pricing policies. According to a duopoly competition model, the consumer is limited to a single firm visit per period. The consumer decides to purchase the product at current price from a firm and remain in the market to purchase product from the other firm in the next period or exit the market. The results offer three main conclusions. First, elastic pricing is consistent with dynamic pricing. Second, the more consumers visit the firm in the first period, the more profits the firm will make. Third, we explore the effectiveness of different pricing policies. 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subjects | Competition Consumers Discounts Economic models Markets Mathematical problems Optimization Pricing Pricing policies Profits |
title | Two-Period Dynamic versus Fixed-Ratio Pricing Policies under Duopoly Competition |
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