The Rating Game: The Discipline of Uber’s User-Generated Ratings

On-demand labor platforms are built around user-generated rating systems that entail consumers’ monitoring of workers as a tool for algorithmic labor management. The user-generated ratings can directly determine workers’ employability. Workers are thus under pressure to score well, though they may l...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Surveillance & society 2019-03, Vol.17 (1/2), p.183-190
Main Author: Chan, Ngai Keung
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Algorithms
Anxiety
Behavior modification
Computer supported cooperative work
Consciousness
Consumers
Drivers
Employability
Games
Internalization
Labor
Normalization
Organizational change
Power
Rating services
Ratings & rankings
Ride sharing services
Society
Surveillance
Verbal communication
Workers
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Summary:On-demand labor platforms are built around user-generated rating systems that entail consumers’ monitoring of workers as a tool for algorithmic labor management. The user-generated ratings can directly determine workers’ employability. Workers are thus under pressure to score well, though they may lack knowledge about the performance metrics. Using in-depth interviews with Uber drivers, this article examines how Uber’s rating system as an engine of anxiety shapes drivers’ work practices through processes of surveillance and normalization. Specifically, drivers are prompted to play the rating game, a game that pressures them toward the normalization of platform surveillance and self-discipline for maximizing their ratings. The internalization of ratings is channeled through drivers’ reactive practices in the rating game—that is, drivers’ modification of their behavior in response to being evaluated and monitored. This article considers the socio-technical conditions under which drivers are subject to the platform surveillance and disciplinary power.
ISSN:1477-7487
1477-7487
DOI:10.24908/ss.v17i1/2.12911