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A revision to Godel's incompleteness theorem by neutrosophy
According to Smarandache's neutrosophy, the Godel's incompleteness theorem contains the truth, the falsehood, and the indeterminacy of a statement under consideration. It is shown in this paper that the proof of Godel's incompleteness theorem is faulty, because all possible situations...
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Published in: | International journal of mathematical combinatorics 2008-01, Vol.1, p.45 |
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Main Authors: | , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | According to Smarandache's neutrosophy, the Godel's incompleteness theorem contains the truth, the falsehood, and the indeterminacy of a statement under consideration. It is shown in this paper that the proof of Godel's incompleteness theorem is faulty, because all possible situations are not considered (such as the situation where from some axioms wrong results can be deducted, for example, from the axiom of choice the paradox of the doubling ball theorem can be deducted; and many kinds of indeterminate situations, for example, a proposition can be proved in 9999 cases, and only in 1 case it can be neither proved, nor disproved). With all possible situations being considered with Smarandache's neutrosophy, the Godel's Incompleteness theorem is revised into the incompleteness axiom: Any proposition in any formal mathematical axiom system will represent, respectively, the truth (T), the falsehood (F), and the indeterminacy (I) of the statement under consideration, where T, I, F are standard or non-standard real subsets of ]-0,1+[. Considering all possible situations, any possible paradox is no longer a paradox. Finally several famous paradoxes in history, as well as the so-called unified theory, ultimate theory, , etc. are discussed. |
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ISSN: | 1937-1055 1937-1047 |