Loading…
Can There Be a Recovery-Oriented Diagnostic Practice?
Despite the prevalence of the DSM in mental health practice, research, and the public imagination, it remains the target of criticism. With the publication of another volume in the DSM series, we have seen increased dialogue regarding the necessity of viable alternatives that do not succumb to the p...
Saved in:
Published in: | The Journal of humanistic psychology 2019-05, Vol.59 (3), p.319-338 |
---|---|
Main Authors: | , , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | Despite the prevalence of the DSM in mental health practice, research, and the public imagination, it remains the target of criticism. With the publication of another volume in the DSM series, we have seen increased dialogue regarding the necessity of viable alternatives that do not succumb to the pitfalls of a descriptive diagnostic system. In this article, we explore a framework for a recovery-oriented and person-centered diagnostic practice along with an example based in Experiential Constructivism. We discuss 10 principles of a recovery-oriented approach founded on our requirements that diagnosis should be collaborative, future-oriented, and facilitative of meaning making. We argue for diagnosis that goes beyond labeling people’s mental health conditions, enhances provider–consumer relationships, and supports recovery-oriented practices. We then provide one example of this approach from a study that explored client and therapist understandings of DSM and Experiential Constructivist diagnoses. We conclude by briefly discussing the implications of developing and applying new diagnostic practices in mental health care, specifically the practices that would also need to be in place to sustain any alternative diagnostic approach to the DSM. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0022-1678 1552-650X |
DOI: | 10.1177/0022167818787609 |