Decision period and Duverger's psychological effect in FPTP elections: Evidence from India

The plurality rule creates incentives that can divert the vote from the third parties. I argue that the process that converts such Duvergerian incentives into the Duvergerian outcomes has a temporal dimension: both strategic and non-strategic voters need time to form and communicate their preference...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Electoral studies 2019-04, Vol.58, p.21-30
Main Author: Zhirnov, Andrei
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Campaign period
Campaigns
Candidates
Duverger's Law
Elections
FPTP
Incentives
Rolling elections
Strategic voting
Voters
Voting rules
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Summary:The plurality rule creates incentives that can divert the vote from the third parties. I argue that the process that converts such Duvergerian incentives into the Duvergerian outcomes has a temporal dimension: both strategic and non-strategic voters need time to form and communicate their preferences over candidates. To examine this connection, I capitalize on the institution of phased voting in India. I treat the timing of the district vote as the endpoint of the campaign period in the district and evaluate its effect on the vote for the leaders and the third parties, the third parties’ vote share, and the vote concentration. I find a positive effect of campaign period duration on the extent of the observed strategic behaviors in the district.
ISSN:0261-3794
1873-6890
DOI:10.1016/j.electstud.2019.01.004