Simulation-based selective opening security for receivers under chosen-ciphertext attacks

Security against selective opening attack (SOA) for receivers requires that in a multi-user setting, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts, and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts, the remaining (potential...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Designs, codes, and cryptography codes, and cryptography, 2019-06, Vol.87 (6), p.1345-1371
Main Authors: Huang, Zhengan, Lai, Junzuo, Chen, Wenbin, Au, Man Ho, Peng, Zhen, Li, Jin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Algorithms
Circuits
Coding and Information Theory
Computer Science
Cryptology
Data Structures and Information Theory
Discrete Mathematics in Computer Science
Encryption
Information and Communication
Public Key Infrastructure
Receivers
Security
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Summary:Security against selective opening attack (SOA) for receivers requires that in a multi-user setting, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts, and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts, the remaining (potentially related) ciphertexts retain their privacy. In this paper, we study simulation-based selective opening security for receivers of public key encryption (PKE) schemes under chosen-ciphertext attacks (RSIM-SO-CCA). Concretely, we first show that some known PKE schemes meet RSIM-SO-CCA security. Then, we introduce the notion of master-key SOA security for identity-based encryption (IBE), and extend the Canetti–Halevi–Katz transformation to show generic PKE constructions achieving RSIM-SO-CCA security. Finally, we show how to construct an IBE scheme achieving master-key SOA security.
ISSN:0925-1022
1573-7586
DOI:10.1007/s10623-018-0530-1