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Equilibrium threshold joining strategies in partially observable batch service queueing systems
We study the strategic customer behavior in queueing systems with batch services under incomplete information. In particular, we assume that arriving customers have the opportunity to observe only the number of waiting batches upon arrival and, afterwards, they make their join/balk decisions. We pro...
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Published in: | Annals of operations research 2019-06, Vol.277 (2), p.231-253 |
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Main Authors: | , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | We study the strategic customer behavior in queueing systems with batch services under incomplete information. In particular, we assume that arriving customers have the opportunity to observe only the number of waiting batches upon arrival and, afterwards, they make their join/balk decisions. We prove that equilibrium strategies always exist within the legitimate class of threshold strategies, but they may not be unique. We also provide an algorithmic scheme for their computation. Moreover, we compare the strategic behavior under this information level with the corresponding behavior in the complete information case. |
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ISSN: | 0254-5330 1572-9338 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s10479-017-2630-0 |