The alience of a recipient's alternatives: Inter- and intrapersonal comparisons in ultimatum games

The social utility model suggests that in social decision-making, both inter- and intrapersonal comparisons are important in assessing the utility of a decision outcome. In the ultimatum game both these comparisons play a role. This is especially true for recipients reacting to an unfair offer. It i...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Organizational behavior and human decision processes 2003-01, Vol.90 (1), p.165
Main Authors: Handgraaf, Michael J J, Eric van Dijk, Wilke, Henk A M, Vermunt, Riel C
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Decision making
Organizational behavior
Studies
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:The social utility model suggests that in social decision-making, both inter- and intrapersonal comparisons are important in assessing the utility of a decision outcome. In the ultimatum game both these comparisons play a role. This is especially true for recipients reacting to an unfair offer. It is proposed that the relative weights inter- and intrapersonal comparisons receive in ultimatum games depend on the way the decision is structured. In three studies it is shown that presenting recipients with a straightforward choice instead of the usual accept/reject question makes recipients more included to accept unfair offers. Moreover, the existence of an alternative outcome, i.e., the fact that refusal of the offer also leads to a substantial outcome, similarly raises the level of acceptances in a standard ultimatum game. Results are discussed in relation to the joint/separate evaluation disparity and the distinction between occurrences and non-occurrences.
ISSN:0749-5978
1095-9920