On the efficiency of ‘single window

In many countries, the process of obtaining government approval for different projects involves interaction with multiple government agencies at various levels. This often makes the approval process inefficient by unnecessary lengthening it. In this paper we study the effect of a re-organization of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic theory 2010-05, Vol.43 (2), p.207-226
Main Authors: Athreya, Krishna B, Bishnu, Monisankar
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Approximation
Bureaucracy
Corruption in government
Economic aspects
Economic efficiency
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Efficiency
Efficiency metrics
Employee efficiency
Game Theory
Government
Government agencies
Government bureaucracy
Government corruption
Inefficiency
Investors
Microeconomics
Public Finance
Queueing
Random variables
Recommendations
Regulatory approval
Research Article
Single window policy
Social and Behav. Sciences
Stochastic analysis
Stochastic equilibrium
Stochastic models
Studies
Workforce
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Summary:In many countries, the process of obtaining government approval for different projects involves interaction with multiple government agencies at various levels. This often makes the approval process inefficient by unnecessary lengthening it. In this paper we study the effect of a re-organization of the approval process towards making it a single window clearance system, on the efficiency of the entire process. We have used the expected queue length and the expected waiting time in the system at the stochastic steady state as measures of inefficiency of an approval system.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-009-0438-0