Anger: Scary Good

I argue that recent attempts to vindicate blame have failed to fully face the vengeful feelings and angry outbursts that have led to scepticism about blame's ethical status. This paper endeavours to fill that gap. I claim that feelings of angry blame are characteristically responsive to threats...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Australasian journal of philosophy 2019-07, Vol.97 (3), p.451-464
Main Author: Reis-Dennis, Samuel
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Anger
angry blame
blame
disappointment
Ethics
Philosophy
power
resentment
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Summary:I argue that recent attempts to vindicate blame have failed to fully face the vengeful feelings and angry outbursts that have led to scepticism about blame's ethical status. This paper endeavours to fill that gap. I claim that feelings of angry blame are characteristically responsive to threats to social status, and that angry expressions are distinctive because of their scariness. Still, I conclude, there is an important place for angry blame in good lives and good relationships. In offering a defence of angry feelings and expressions, I argue that blame's seemingly objectionable features are crucial to its expressive and restorative power.
ISSN:0004-8402
1471-6828
DOI:10.1080/00048402.2018.1520268