The Puzzle of Thought Experiments in Conceptual Metaphor Research

How can thought experiments lead to new empirical knowledge if they do not make use of empirical information? This puzzle has been widely discussed in the philosophy of science. It arises in conceptual metaphor research as well and is especially important for the clarification of its empirical found...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Foundations of science 2015-06, Vol.20 (2), p.147-174
Main Author: Kertesz, Andras
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Experiments
Linguistics
Mathematical Logic and Foundations
Methodology of the Social Sciences
Philosophy
Philosophy of Science
Science
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Summary:How can thought experiments lead to new empirical knowledge if they do not make use of empirical information? This puzzle has been widely discussed in the philosophy of science. It arises in conceptual metaphor research as well and is especially important for the clarification of its empirical foundations. The aim of the paper is to suggest a possible solution to the puzzle of thought experiments in conceptual metaphor research. The solution rests on the application of a novel metatheoretical framework that conceives of linguistic theorizing as a process of plausible argumentation. The central idea of the solution is that through the dynamic feedback mechanism of the cyclic, prismatic and retrospective re-evaluation of information, thought experiments in conceptual metaphor research may indirectly supply the process of plausible argumentation with empirical knowledge.
ISSN:1233-1821
1572-8471
DOI:10.1007/s10699-014-9357-z