Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems

We search for impartiality in the allocation of objects when monetary transfers are not possible. Our main focus is anonymity . The standard definition requires that if agents’ names are permuted, their assignments be permuted in the same way. Since no rule satisfies this definition, we introduce we...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Review of economic design 2019-12, Vol.23 (3-4), p.113-126
Main Author: Kondo, Hikaru
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Game Theory
Microeconomics
Original Paper
Social and Behav. Sciences
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:We search for impartiality in the allocation of objects when monetary transfers are not possible. Our main focus is anonymity . The standard definition requires that if agents’ names are permuted, their assignments be permuted in the same way. Since no rule satisfies this definition, we introduce weaker variants, “anonymity for distinct preferences,” “pairwise-anonymity for distinct preferences,” “pairwise-anonymity for fully differentiated profiles,” and “independence of others’ permutations.” We show that for more than two agents and two objects, no rule is pairwise-anonymous for distinct preferences and Pareto-efficient (Theorem  1 ), no rule is pairwise-anonymous for distinct preferences and independent of others’ permutations (Theorem  2 ), and no rule is pairwise-anonymous for fully differentiated profiles and strategy-proof (Theorem  3 ).
ISSN:1434-4742
1434-4750
DOI:10.1007/s10058-019-00223-1