Inference and Epistemic Transparency

In his paper “Explaining Deductive Inference” Prawitz states what he calls «a fundamental problem of logic and the philosophy of logic»: the problem of explaining «Why do certain inferences have the epistemic power to confer evidence on the conclusion when applied to premisses for which there is evi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Topoi 2019-09, Vol.38 (3), p.517-530
Main Author: Usberti, Gabriele
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Epistemology
Philosophy
Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Technology
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Summary:In his paper “Explaining Deductive Inference” Prawitz states what he calls «a fundamental problem of logic and the philosophy of logic»: the problem of explaining «Why do certain inferences have the epistemic power to confer evidence on the conclusion when applied to premisses for which there is evidence already?». In this paper I suggest a way of articulating, and partly modifying, the intuitionistic answer to this problem in such a way as to both answer Prawitz’s problem and satisfy a requirement I argue to be crucial for any epistemic theory of the meaning of the logical constants: the requirement that evidence is epistemically transparent.
ISSN:0167-7411
1572-8749
DOI:10.1007/s11245-017-9497-1