Information aggregation with a continuum of types

We study the problem of designing a voting rule which makes voting by cut-off strategies efficient for settings where voters have state-dependent common preferences over and vote on accepting or rejecting an issue but hold private information in the form of continuous types about the true state. We...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics letters 2019-07, Vol.180, p.46-49
Main Authors: Bozbay, Irem, Peters, Hans
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Binary voting
Continuous processing
Continuous types
Efficient information aggregation
Information processing
Mathematical models
Strategic voting
Voters
Voting
Voting rules
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Summary:We study the problem of designing a voting rule which makes voting by cut-off strategies efficient for settings where voters have state-dependent common preferences over and vote on accepting or rejecting an issue but hold private information in the form of continuous types about the true state. We show that such rules only exist under a restrictive condition on the model parameters. •Voters receive continuous signals but can only vote yes or no.•All voters wish the most likely decision to be taken.•Symmetric cut-off strategy profiles are considered.•Efficient voting can only be reached under a restrictive condition and using quota rules, essentially reproducing the case of binary signals.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.035