Stay-in-a-set games

There exists a Nash equilibrium ([straight epsilon]-Nash equilibrium) for every n-person stochastic game with a finite (countable) state space and finite action sets for the players if the payoff to each player i is one when the process of states remains in a given set of states Gi and is zero other...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal of game theory 2002-05, Vol.30 (4), p.479-490
Main Authors: Secchi, Piercesare, Sudderth, William D.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Equilibrium
Gambling
Game theory
Probability
Probability distribution
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Summary:There exists a Nash equilibrium ([straight epsilon]-Nash equilibrium) for every n-person stochastic game with a finite (countable) state space and finite action sets for the players if the payoff to each player i is one when the process of states remains in a given set of states Gi and is zero otherwise.
ISSN:0020-7276
1432-1270
DOI:10.1007/s001820200092