A Reply to Nina Emery

This article argues against Nina Emery's view that there are compelling reasons to believe in nomological probabilities. To the degree that we can see no other way to detect the occurrence of the explanans apart from the bare fact that the explanandum happened, we may be skeptical that the prop...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy of science 2019-10, Vol.86 (4), p.794-806
Main Author: Mitchell, Sam
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
DISCUSSION
Quantum mechanics
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Summary:This article argues against Nina Emery's view that there are compelling reasons to believe in nomological probabilities. To the degree that we can see no other way to detect the occurrence of the explanans apart from the bare fact that the explanandum happened, we may be skeptical that the proposed explanation is correct and open to the possibility that there is none. This provides us with a way to distinguish physical entities from mathematical ones, illuminating interpretations of quantum mechanics.
ISSN:0031-8248
1539-767X
DOI:10.1086/704984