The Model Theoretic Argument, Indirect Realism, and the Causal Theory of Reference Objection

: Hilary Putnam has reformulated his model‐theoretic argument as an argument against indirect realism in the philosophy of perception. This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam's new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of h...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Pacific philosophical quarterly 2003-06, Vol.84 (2), p.146-154
Main Author: Reynolds, Steven L.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Perceptions
Philosophy
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Summary:: Hilary Putnam has reformulated his model‐theoretic argument as an argument against indirect realism in the philosophy of perception. This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam's new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of his previous responses to the objection from the causal theory of reference. It is argued that the model‐theoretic argument can also be construed as an argument that holders of a causal theory of reference should adopt direct realism in the philosophy of perception.
ISSN:0279-0750
1468-0114
DOI:10.1111/1468-0114.00167