Does hallucinating involve perceiving?

A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states is ordinary perception, in which a subject is successfully related to her mind-independent surroundings. Correspondingly, the simplest theory of perceptual states models all such states on perception. Typically, this simple, common-factor re...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical studies 2018-03, Vol.175 (3), p.601-627
Main Author: Ali, Rami
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Hallucinations
Illusionism
Metaphysics
Perceptions
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Sensory perception
Theory
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states is ordinary perception, in which a subject is successfully related to her mind-independent surroundings. Correspondingly, the simplest theory of perceptual states models all such states on perception. Typically, this simple, common-factor relational view of perceptual states has received a perfunctory dismissal on the grounds that hallucinations are nonperceptual. But I argue that the nonperceptual view of hallucinations has been accepted too quickly. I consider three observations thought to support the view, and argue that all three are dealt with equally well by an alternative view, illusionism, on which hallucinations do involve perception. Since this is so, adopting a common-factor relational view of all perceptual states remains a tenable option.
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-017-0884-7