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Does hallucinating involve perceiving?

A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states is ordinary perception, in which a subject is successfully related to her mind-independent surroundings. Correspondingly, the simplest theory of perceptual states models all such states on perception. Typically, this simple, common-factor re...

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Published in:	Philosophical studies 2018-03, Vol.175 (3), p.601-627
Main Author:	Ali, Rami
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Education Epistemology Ethics Hallucinations Illusionism Metaphysics Perceptions Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Sensory perception Theory
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description	A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states is ordinary perception, in which a subject is successfully related to her mind-independent surroundings. Correspondingly, the simplest theory of perceptual states models all such states on perception. Typically, this simple, common-factor relational view of perceptual states has received a perfunctory dismissal on the grounds that hallucinations are nonperceptual. But I argue that the nonperceptual view of hallucinations has been accepted too quickly. I consider three observations thought to support the view, and argue that all three are dealt with equally well by an alternative view, illusionism, on which hallucinations do involve perception. Since this is so, adopting a common-factor relational view of all perceptual states remains a tenable option.
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source	EBSCOhost MLA International Bibliography With Full Text; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Springer Nature
subjects	Education Epistemology Ethics Hallucinations Illusionism Metaphysics Perceptions Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Sensory perception Theory
title	Does hallucinating involve perceiving?
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