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CLOTHES DON'T MAKE THE MAN (OR WOMAN), BUT GENDER IDENTITY MIGHT

(11) See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a challenge to a policy that prohibited men, but not women, from having long hair); Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding an employer's policy which requ...

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Published in:Columbia journal of gender and law 2006-01, Vol.15 (1), p.90
Main Author: Levi, Jennifer L
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description (11) See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a challenge to a policy that prohibited men, but not women, from having long hair); Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding an employer's policy which required male employees to have short hair, but which did not require the same for female employees); Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987) (dismissing a Title VII claim alleging that a grooming policy imposed unduly harsh requirements on women); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring male, but not female, employees to wear ties was not sex discrimination under Title VII); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding a policy that limited the manner in which hair of men could be cut and that limited the manner in which women's hair could be styled); Earwood v. Continental Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding sex differentiated grooming standards consistent with Title VII); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding a policy which required short hair for men, but not women); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding grooming policy that "reflect[ed] customary modes of grooming" acceptable even though differences in policy existed for men and women); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding a policy that prohibited only men from wearing long hair); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding acceptable under Title VII a grooming policy requiring male employees to maintain their hair length above the collar); Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding a "policy that prohibits to both sexes a style more often adopted by members of one sex" under a Title VII challenge); Lanigan v. Bartlett and Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (D. Mo. 1979) (finding a sex discrimination claim insufficient where an employer prohibited female, but not male, employees from wearing pantsuits in the executive office). (18) See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). For the previous twenty years that [Darlene Jespersen] worked at Harrah's, her employer encouraged her and other female beverage servers to wear makeup alt
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Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a challenge to a policy that prohibited men, but not women, from having long hair); Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding an employer's policy which required male employees to have short hair, but which did not require the same for female employees); Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987) (dismissing a Title VII claim alleging that a grooming policy imposed unduly harsh requirements on women); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring male, but not female, employees to wear ties was not sex discrimination under Title VII); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding a policy that limited the manner in which hair of men could be cut and that limited the manner in which women's hair could be styled); Earwood v. Continental Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding sex differentiated grooming standards consistent with Title VII); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet &amp; Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding a policy which required short hair for men, but not women); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding grooming policy that "reflect[ed] customary modes of grooming" acceptable even though differences in policy existed for men and women); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding a policy that prohibited only men from wearing long hair); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding acceptable under Title VII a grooming policy requiring male employees to maintain their hair length above the collar); Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding a "policy that prohibits to both sexes a style more often adopted by members of one sex" under a Title VII challenge); Lanigan v. Bartlett and Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (D. Mo. 1979) (finding a sex discrimination claim insufficient where an employer prohibited female, but not male, employees from wearing pantsuits in the executive office). (18) See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). For the previous twenty years that [Darlene Jespersen] worked at Harrah's, her employer encouraged her and other female beverage servers to wear makeup although it was not a job requirement. Id. at 1077. It was not until 2000 that Harrah's implemented its "Beverage Department Image Transformation" program, imposing "appearance standards" on its employees. Id. Although all beverage servers, regardless of gender, were required to "[be] well groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and body toned, and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the specified uniform," it incorporated sex-differentiated requirements to carry out its goals. Id. Notably, women were required to wear colored nail polish, make-up, and styled hair; men were prohibited from doing so. Id. (72) See Doe, 2000 WL 33162199, at *8. The court stated that the school had suspended Doe "on account of the expression of her very identity," and in ruling in Doe's favor, the court considered the harm that Doe would suffer if she was not allowed to return to school in clothing which conformed to her gender identity. "[I]f plaintiff is barred from school, the potential harm to plaintiff's sense of self-worth and social development [would be] irreparable." See [Carla Enriquez], 777 A.2d at 373. The court discussed gender and its relation to one's sense of self before concluding that the law should prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex or gender. In the end, the court agreed with the notion that "a person's sex or sexuality embraces an individual's gender, that is, one's self-image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character." Id. 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Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a challenge to a policy that prohibited men, but not women, from having long hair); Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding an employer's policy which required male employees to have short hair, but which did not require the same for female employees); Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987) (dismissing a Title VII claim alleging that a grooming policy imposed unduly harsh requirements on women); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring male, but not female, employees to wear ties was not sex discrimination under Title VII); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding a policy that limited the manner in which hair of men could be cut and that limited the manner in which women's hair could be styled); Earwood v. Continental Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding sex differentiated grooming standards consistent with Title VII); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet &amp; Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding a policy which required short hair for men, but not women); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding grooming policy that "reflect[ed] customary modes of grooming" acceptable even though differences in policy existed for men and women); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding a policy that prohibited only men from wearing long hair); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding acceptable under Title VII a grooming policy requiring male employees to maintain their hair length above the collar); Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding a "policy that prohibits to both sexes a style more often adopted by members of one sex" under a Title VII challenge); Lanigan v. Bartlett and Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (D. Mo. 1979) (finding a sex discrimination claim insufficient where an employer prohibited female, but not male, employees from wearing pantsuits in the executive office). (18) See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). For the previous twenty years that [Darlene Jespersen] worked at Harrah's, her employer encouraged her and other female beverage servers to wear makeup although it was not a job requirement. Id. at 1077. It was not until 2000 that Harrah's implemented its "Beverage Department Image Transformation" program, imposing "appearance standards" on its employees. Id. Although all beverage servers, regardless of gender, were required to "[be] well groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and body toned, and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the specified uniform," it incorporated sex-differentiated requirements to carry out its goals. Id. Notably, women were required to wear colored nail polish, make-up, and styled hair; men were prohibited from doing so. Id. (72) See Doe, 2000 WL 33162199, at *8. The court stated that the school had suspended Doe "on account of the expression of her very identity," and in ruling in Doe's favor, the court considered the harm that Doe would suffer if she was not allowed to return to school in clothing which conformed to her gender identity. "[I]f plaintiff is barred from school, the potential harm to plaintiff's sense of self-worth and social development [would be] irreparable." See [Carla Enriquez], 777 A.2d at 373. The court discussed gender and its relation to one's sense of self before concluding that the law should prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex or gender. In the end, the court agreed with the notion that "a person's sex or sexuality embraces an individual's gender, that is, one's self-image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character." Id. 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Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a challenge to a policy that prohibited men, but not women, from having long hair); Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding an employer's policy which required male employees to have short hair, but which did not require the same for female employees); Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987) (dismissing a Title VII claim alleging that a grooming policy imposed unduly harsh requirements on women); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring male, but not female, employees to wear ties was not sex discrimination under Title VII); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding a policy that limited the manner in which hair of men could be cut and that limited the manner in which women's hair could be styled); Earwood v. Continental Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding sex differentiated grooming standards consistent with Title VII); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet &amp; Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding a policy which required short hair for men, but not women); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding grooming policy that "reflect[ed] customary modes of grooming" acceptable even though differences in policy existed for men and women); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding a policy that prohibited only men from wearing long hair); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding acceptable under Title VII a grooming policy requiring male employees to maintain their hair length above the collar); Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding a "policy that prohibits to both sexes a style more often adopted by members of one sex" under a Title VII challenge); Lanigan v. Bartlett and Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (D. Mo. 1979) (finding a sex discrimination claim insufficient where an employer prohibited female, but not male, employees from wearing pantsuits in the executive office). (18) See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). For the previous twenty years that [Darlene Jespersen] worked at Harrah's, her employer encouraged her and other female beverage servers to wear makeup although it was not a job requirement. Id. at 1077. It was not until 2000 that Harrah's implemented its "Beverage Department Image Transformation" program, imposing "appearance standards" on its employees. Id. Although all beverage servers, regardless of gender, were required to "[be] well groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and body toned, and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the specified uniform," it incorporated sex-differentiated requirements to carry out its goals. Id. Notably, women were required to wear colored nail polish, make-up, and styled hair; men were prohibited from doing so. Id. (72) See Doe, 2000 WL 33162199, at *8. The court stated that the school had suspended Doe "on account of the expression of her very identity," and in ruling in Doe's favor, the court considered the harm that Doe would suffer if she was not allowed to return to school in clothing which conformed to her gender identity. "[I]f plaintiff is barred from school, the potential harm to plaintiff's sense of self-worth and social development [would be] irreparable." See [Carla Enriquez], 777 A.2d at 373. The court discussed gender and its relation to one's sense of self before concluding that the law should prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex or gender. In the end, the court agreed with the notion that "a person's sex or sexuality embraces an individual's gender, that is, one's self-image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and character." Id. (citation omitted).</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>Columbia University, School of Law</pub></addata></record>
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identifier ISSN: 1062-6220
ispartof Columbia journal of gender and law, 2006-01, Vol.15 (1), p.90
issn 1062-6220
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subjects Families & family life
Gender
Households
Non-binary gender
Social conditions & trends
Society
title CLOTHES DON'T MAKE THE MAN (OR WOMAN), BUT GENDER IDENTITY MIGHT
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