Moral Obstinacy in Political Negotiations

• Published in: Political psychology 2020-02, Vol.41 (1), p.3-20
• Main Authors: Delton, Andrew W., DeScioli, Peter, Ryan, Timothy J.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: attitude strength; Bargaining; Behavioral economics; Conservatism; Economic research; experimental political science; Experiments; Measurement; moral conviction; moral psychology; Morality; Negotiation; Psychology; ultimatum game
• ISSN: 0162-895X; 1467-9221
• DOI: 10.1111/pops.12612

Research in behavioral economics finds that moral considerations bear on the offers that people make and accept in negotiations. This finding is relevant for political negotiations, wherein moral concerns are manifold. However, behavioral economics has yet to incorporate a major theme from moral psychology: People differ, sometimes immensely, in which issues they perceive to be a matter of morality. We review research about the measurement and characteristics of moral convictions. We hypothesize that moral conviction leads to uncompromising bargaining strategies and failed negotiations. We test this theory in three incentivized experiments in which participants bargain over political policies with real payoffs at stake. We find that participants' moral convictions are linked with aggressive bargaining strategies, which helps explain why it is harder to forge bargains on some political issues than others. We also find substantial asymmetries between liberals and conservatives in the intensity of their moral convictions about different issues.