CO-OPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS THROUGH POSITION UNCERTAINTY

We present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecess...

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Published in:The Economic journal (London) 2019-07, Vol.129 (621), p.2137-2154
Main Authors: Gallice, Andrea, Monzón, Ignacio
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic theory
Game theory
Natural environment
Social conditions & trends
Social dilemmas
Uncertainty
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description We present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecessors. Since agents realise that their own action may be observed, they have an incentive to contribute in order to induce potential successors to also do so. Full contribution can then emerge in equilibrium. The same environment leads to full co-operation in the prisoners’ dilemma.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/ecoj.12636
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source EconLit s plnými texty; EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Oxford Journals Online
subjects Economic theory
Game theory
Natural environment
Social conditions & trends
Social dilemmas
Uncertainty
title CO-OPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS THROUGH POSITION UNCERTAINTY
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