Elusive vehicles of genetic representation

The teleosemantic theory of representational content is held by some philosophers to imply that genes carry semantic information about whole-organism phenotypes. In this paper, I argue that this position is not supported by empirical findings. I focus on one of the most elaborate defenses of this po...

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Published in:Biology & philosophy 2020-02, Vol.35 (1), Article 24
Main Author: Kõiv, Riin
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Language:English
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Education
Evolutionary Biology
Phenotypes
Philosophy
Philosophy of Biology
Vehicles
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description The teleosemantic theory of representational content is held by some philosophers to imply that genes carry semantic information about whole-organism phenotypes. In this paper, I argue that this position is not supported by empirical findings. I focus on one of the most elaborate defenses of this position: Shea’s (Biol Philos 22:313–331, 2007a, Br J Philos Sci 64:1–31, 2013a) view that genes represent whole-organism phenotypes. I distinguish between two ways of individuating genes in contemporary biological science as possible vehicles of representational content—as molecular genes and as difference-maker genes. I show that given either of these ways of individuating genes, genes fail to meet conditions which the teleosemantic theory requires an entity to meet if that entity is to qualify as a representational vehicle that represents a whole-organism phenotype. The considerations I present against Shea’s view generalize to other attempts to use the teleosemantic theory in support of the claim that genes represent whole-organism phenotypes.
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subjects Education
Evolutionary Biology
Phenotypes
Philosophy
Philosophy of Biology
Vehicles
title Elusive vehicles of genetic representation
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