Dworkin's Two Conceptions of Rights

This brief reply redefends the view that two distinct conceptions of the justification and structure of constitutional rights can be found in constitutional theory, political philosophy, and the discourse of constitutional adjudication. The first is labeled the immunities conception; the second is c...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of legal studies 2000-01, Vol.29 (1), p.309-315
Main Author: Pildes, Richard H.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
College admission
Constitutional law
Dworkin, Ronald
Freedom of speech
Immunity
Justified beliefs
Law schools
Philosophy
Political discourse
Political ideologies
Political particularism
Political theory
Single status
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Summary:This brief reply redefends the view that two distinct conceptions of the justification and structure of constitutional rights can be found in constitutional theory, political philosophy, and the discourse of constitutional adjudication. The first is labeled the immunities conception; the second is characterized as the structural or reason‐restraining conception of rights. This reply also defends the common association of Ronald Dworkin'sTaking Rights Seriouslywith the immunities view, while recognizing that multiple conceptions of the justifications and structure of rights can be found in Dworkin's corpus of writings.
ISSN:0047-2530
1537-5366
DOI:10.1086/468073