Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available

We present a model where a long run player is allowed to use both money transfers and threats to influence the decisions of a sequence of short run players. We show that threats might be used credibly (even in arbitrarily short repeated games) by a long‐lived player who gains by developing a reputat...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economics & management strategy 2007-09, Vol.16 (3), p.577-598
Main Authors: Dal Bó, Ernesto, Dal Bó, Pedro, Di Tella, Rafael
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic models
Extortion
Game theory
Influence
Judicial corruption
Lobbying
Reputations
Studies
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Summary:We present a model where a long run player is allowed to use both money transfers and threats to influence the decisions of a sequence of short run players. We show that threats might be used credibly (even in arbitrarily short repeated games) by a long‐lived player who gains by developing a reputation of carrying out punishments. Particular cases of the model are a long‐lived pressure group offering rewards and punishments to a series of targets (public or corporate officials) in exchange for policy favors, or that of a long‐lived extorter who demands money in order not to punish. We use the model to analyze the “convicted nonpayor” debate around judicial corruption. The model highlights formal similarities between lobbying and extortion.
ISSN:1058-6407
1530-9134
DOI:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2007.00151.x