He who must not be named

Landsberger et al. have studied a sealed bid first price auction with two players in which the ranking of the valuations is known. They argue that such a situation can arise in a sequential auction where only the name of the winner is revealed. In this paper we consider sequential auctions where two...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Review of economic design 2003-08, Vol.8 (1), p.99-1
Main Author: F vrier, Philippe
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Asymmetry
Auctions
Bids
Games
Hypotheses
Simulation
Valuation
Citations: Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Landsberger et al. have studied a sealed bid first price auction with two players in which the ranking of the valuations is known. They argue that such a situation can arise in a sequential auction where only the name of the winner is revealed. In this paper we consider sequential auctions where two identical goods are sold sequentially to
ISSN:1434-4742
1434-4750
DOI:10.1007/s10058-003-0094-y