Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes

This paper examines the relationship between the wealth and power of states and their ability to participate fully within the World Trade Organization's system of dispute resolution. Two alternative hypotheses are considered. The power hypothesis predicts that politically weak countries will re...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of legal studies 2005-06, Vol.34 (2), p.557-598
Main Authors: Guzman, Andrew T., Simmons, Beth A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Conflict Resolution
Defendants
Developing countries
Embassies
Government bureaucracy
Grievances
Gross domestic product
Imports
International disputes
International Economic Organizations
International relations
International Trade
Law
Litigation
Member states
Plaintiffs
Political power
Power
Retaliation
Settlements & damages
State Power
Trade agreements
Wealth
World Trade Organization
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Summary:This paper examines the relationship between the wealth and power of states and their ability to participate fully within the World Trade Organization's system of dispute resolution. Two alternative hypotheses are considered. The power hypothesis predicts that politically weak countries will refrain from filing complaints against politically powerful states for fear of costly retaliation. The capacity hypothesis predicts that low‐income states will tend to complain about behavior by high‐income states because the latter offer a higher expected return. We test these two hypotheses and find considerable support for the capacity hypothesis and no support for the power hypothesis. We conclude that poor states behave differently than their rich counterparts because they lack the financial, human, and institutional capital to participate fully in the dispute resolution system.
ISSN:0047-2530
1537-5366
DOI:10.1086/430767