Another look at provable security

We give an informal analysis and critique of several typical "provable security" results. In some cases there are intuitive but convincing arguments for rejecting the conclusions suggested by the formal terminology and "proofs," whereas in other cases the formalism seems to be co...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of cryptology 2007-01, Vol.20 (1), p.3-37
Main Authors: KOBLITZ, Neal, MENEZES, Alfred J
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied sciences
Cryptography
Exact sciences and technology
Information, signal and communications theory
Security
Signal and communications theory
Telecommunications and information theory
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Summary:We give an informal analysis and critique of several typical "provable security" results. In some cases there are intuitive but convincing arguments for rejecting the conclusions suggested by the formal terminology and "proofs," whereas in other cases the formalism seems to be consistent with common sense. We discuss the reasons why the search for mathematically convincing theoretical evidence to support the security of public-key systems has been an important theme of researchers. However, we argue that the theorem-proof paradigm of theoretical mathematics is often of limited relevance here and frequently leads to papers that are confusing and misleading. Because our paper is aimed at the general mathematical public, it is self-contained and as jargon-free as possible.
ISSN:0933-2790
1432-1378
DOI:10.1007/s00145-005-0432-z