Loading…
Optimal Reinsurance-Investment Problem under a CEV Model: Stochastic Differential Game Formulation
This paper focuses on a stochastic differential game played between two insurance companies, a big one and a small one. In our model, the basic claim process is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift. Both of two insurance companies purchase the reinsurance, respectively. The big company has...
Saved in:
Published in: | Mathematical problems in engineering 2020, Vol.2020 (2020), p.1-19 |
---|---|
Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-883c862651af4a6981bbc0a5cc00d0c2262f3f12c589fba85304bec467fab6a63 |
---|---|
cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-883c862651af4a6981bbc0a5cc00d0c2262f3f12c589fba85304bec467fab6a63 |
container_end_page | 19 |
container_issue | 2020 |
container_start_page | 1 |
container_title | Mathematical problems in engineering |
container_volume | 2020 |
creator | Li, Danping Li, Cunfang Chen, Ruiqing |
description | This paper focuses on a stochastic differential game played between two insurance companies, a big one and a small one. In our model, the basic claim process is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift. Both of two insurance companies purchase the reinsurance, respectively. The big company has sufficient asset to invest in the risky asset which is described by the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model and acquire new business like acting as a reinsurance company of other insurance companies, while the small company can invest in the risk-free asset and purchase reinsurance. The game studied here is zero-sum where there is a single exponential utility. The big company is trying to maximize the expected exponential utility of the terminal wealth to keep its advantage on surplus while simultaneously the small company is trying to minimize the same quantity to reduce its disadvantage. In this paper, we describe the Nash equilibrium of the game and prove a verification theorem for the exponential utility. By solving the corresponding Fleming-Bellman-Isaacs equations, we derive the optimal reinsurance and investment strategies. Furthermore, numerical examples are presented to show our results. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1155/2020/7265121 |
format | article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2397477660</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2397477660</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-883c862651af4a6981bbc0a5cc00d0c2262f3f12c589fba85304bec467fab6a63</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqF0E1LwzAYB_AgCs7pzbMEPGpdXpq09SZzm4PJxDe8lTRNWEabzKRV_PZmbODR0_McfjwvfwDOMbrBmLERQQSNMsIZJvgADDDjNGE4zQ5jj0iaYEI_jsFJCGuECGY4H4BquelMKxr4rIwNvRdWqmRuv1ToWmU7-ORd1agW9rZWHgo4nrzDR1er5ha-dE6uROiMhPdGa-WjN3HSTLQKTp1v-0Z0xtlTcKRFE9TZvg7B23TyOn5IFsvZfHy3SCTlqEvynMqcb48XOhW8yHFVSSSYlAjVSBLCiaYaE8nyQlciZxSllZIpz7SouOB0CC53czfeffbxgXLtem_jypLQIkuzjHMU1fVOSe9C8EqXGx8D8D8lRuU2xXKbYrlPMfKrHV8ZW4tv85--2GkVjdLiT-MiywmnvwI8e14</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2397477660</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Optimal Reinsurance-Investment Problem under a CEV Model: Stochastic Differential Game Formulation</title><source>Wiley-Blackwell Open Access Collection</source><source>Publicly Available Content Database (Proquest) (PQ_SDU_P3)</source><creator>Li, Danping ; Li, Cunfang ; Chen, Ruiqing</creator><contributor>Yu, Wenguang ; Wenguang Yu</contributor><creatorcontrib>Li, Danping ; Li, Cunfang ; Chen, Ruiqing ; Yu, Wenguang ; Wenguang Yu</creatorcontrib><description>This paper focuses on a stochastic differential game played between two insurance companies, a big one and a small one. In our model, the basic claim process is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift. Both of two insurance companies purchase the reinsurance, respectively. The big company has sufficient asset to invest in the risky asset which is described by the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model and acquire new business like acting as a reinsurance company of other insurance companies, while the small company can invest in the risk-free asset and purchase reinsurance. The game studied here is zero-sum where there is a single exponential utility. The big company is trying to maximize the expected exponential utility of the terminal wealth to keep its advantage on surplus while simultaneously the small company is trying to minimize the same quantity to reduce its disadvantage. In this paper, we describe the Nash equilibrium of the game and prove a verification theorem for the exponential utility. By solving the corresponding Fleming-Bellman-Isaacs equations, we derive the optimal reinsurance and investment strategies. Furthermore, numerical examples are presented to show our results.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1024-123X</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1563-5147</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1155/2020/7265121</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cairo, Egypt: Hindawi Publishing Corporation</publisher><subject>Brownian motion ; Differential games ; Engineering ; Expected utility ; Game theory ; Insurance ; Insurance companies ; Investment strategy ; Risk exposure ; Volatility</subject><ispartof>Mathematical problems in engineering, 2020, Vol.2020 (2020), p.1-19</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2020 Danping Li et al.</rights><rights>Copyright © 2020 Danping Li et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-883c862651af4a6981bbc0a5cc00d0c2262f3f12c589fba85304bec467fab6a63</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-883c862651af4a6981bbc0a5cc00d0c2262f3f12c589fba85304bec467fab6a63</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-0187-6461 ; 0000-0003-3882-0971</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/2397477660/fulltextPDF?pq-origsite=primo$$EPDF$$P50$$Gproquest$$Hfree_for_read</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/2397477660?pq-origsite=primo$$EHTML$$P50$$Gproquest$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,4024,25753,27923,27924,27925,37012,44590,74998</link.rule.ids></links><search><contributor>Yu, Wenguang</contributor><contributor>Wenguang Yu</contributor><creatorcontrib>Li, Danping</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Li, Cunfang</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Ruiqing</creatorcontrib><title>Optimal Reinsurance-Investment Problem under a CEV Model: Stochastic Differential Game Formulation</title><title>Mathematical problems in engineering</title><description>This paper focuses on a stochastic differential game played between two insurance companies, a big one and a small one. In our model, the basic claim process is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift. Both of two insurance companies purchase the reinsurance, respectively. The big company has sufficient asset to invest in the risky asset which is described by the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model and acquire new business like acting as a reinsurance company of other insurance companies, while the small company can invest in the risk-free asset and purchase reinsurance. The game studied here is zero-sum where there is a single exponential utility. The big company is trying to maximize the expected exponential utility of the terminal wealth to keep its advantage on surplus while simultaneously the small company is trying to minimize the same quantity to reduce its disadvantage. In this paper, we describe the Nash equilibrium of the game and prove a verification theorem for the exponential utility. By solving the corresponding Fleming-Bellman-Isaacs equations, we derive the optimal reinsurance and investment strategies. Furthermore, numerical examples are presented to show our results.</description><subject>Brownian motion</subject><subject>Differential games</subject><subject>Engineering</subject><subject>Expected utility</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Insurance</subject><subject>Insurance companies</subject><subject>Investment strategy</subject><subject>Risk exposure</subject><subject>Volatility</subject><issn>1024-123X</issn><issn>1563-5147</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>PIMPY</sourceid><recordid>eNqF0E1LwzAYB_AgCs7pzbMEPGpdXpq09SZzm4PJxDe8lTRNWEabzKRV_PZmbODR0_McfjwvfwDOMbrBmLERQQSNMsIZJvgADDDjNGE4zQ5jj0iaYEI_jsFJCGuECGY4H4BquelMKxr4rIwNvRdWqmRuv1ToWmU7-ORd1agW9rZWHgo4nrzDR1er5ha-dE6uROiMhPdGa-WjN3HSTLQKTp1v-0Z0xtlTcKRFE9TZvg7B23TyOn5IFsvZfHy3SCTlqEvynMqcb48XOhW8yHFVSSSYlAjVSBLCiaYaE8nyQlciZxSllZIpz7SouOB0CC53czfeffbxgXLtem_jypLQIkuzjHMU1fVOSe9C8EqXGx8D8D8lRuU2xXKbYrlPMfKrHV8ZW4tv85--2GkVjdLiT-MiywmnvwI8e14</recordid><startdate>2020</startdate><enddate>2020</enddate><creator>Li, Danping</creator><creator>Li, Cunfang</creator><creator>Chen, Ruiqing</creator><general>Hindawi Publishing Corporation</general><general>Hindawi</general><general>Hindawi Limited</general><scope>ADJCN</scope><scope>AHFXO</scope><scope>RHU</scope><scope>RHW</scope><scope>RHX</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TB</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>8FE</scope><scope>8FG</scope><scope>ABJCF</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ARAPS</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BGLVJ</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>CWDGH</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><scope>K7-</scope><scope>KR7</scope><scope>L6V</scope><scope>M7S</scope><scope>P5Z</scope><scope>P62</scope><scope>PIMPY</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PTHSS</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0187-6461</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3882-0971</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>2020</creationdate><title>Optimal Reinsurance-Investment Problem under a CEV Model: Stochastic Differential Game Formulation</title><author>Li, Danping ; Li, Cunfang ; Chen, Ruiqing</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-883c862651af4a6981bbc0a5cc00d0c2262f3f12c589fba85304bec467fab6a63</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Brownian motion</topic><topic>Differential games</topic><topic>Engineering</topic><topic>Expected utility</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Insurance</topic><topic>Insurance companies</topic><topic>Investment strategy</topic><topic>Risk exposure</topic><topic>Volatility</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Li, Danping</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Li, Cunfang</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Ruiqing</creatorcontrib><collection>الدوريات العلمية والإحصائية - e-Marefa Academic and Statistical Periodicals</collection><collection>معرفة - المحتوى العربي الأكاديمي المتكامل - e-Marefa Academic Complete</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Complete</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Subscription Journals</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Open Access Journals</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Mechanical & Transportation Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest SciTech Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Technology Collection</collection><collection>Materials Science & Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>Middle East & Africa Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Computer Science Collection</collection><collection>Computer Science Database</collection><collection>Civil Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Collection</collection><collection>Publicly Available Content Database (Proquest) (PQ_SDU_P3)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>Engineering Collection</collection><jtitle>Mathematical problems in engineering</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Li, Danping</au><au>Li, Cunfang</au><au>Chen, Ruiqing</au><au>Yu, Wenguang</au><au>Wenguang Yu</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Optimal Reinsurance-Investment Problem under a CEV Model: Stochastic Differential Game Formulation</atitle><jtitle>Mathematical problems in engineering</jtitle><date>2020</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>2020</volume><issue>2020</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>19</epage><pages>1-19</pages><issn>1024-123X</issn><eissn>1563-5147</eissn><abstract>This paper focuses on a stochastic differential game played between two insurance companies, a big one and a small one. In our model, the basic claim process is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift. Both of two insurance companies purchase the reinsurance, respectively. The big company has sufficient asset to invest in the risky asset which is described by the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model and acquire new business like acting as a reinsurance company of other insurance companies, while the small company can invest in the risk-free asset and purchase reinsurance. The game studied here is zero-sum where there is a single exponential utility. The big company is trying to maximize the expected exponential utility of the terminal wealth to keep its advantage on surplus while simultaneously the small company is trying to minimize the same quantity to reduce its disadvantage. In this paper, we describe the Nash equilibrium of the game and prove a verification theorem for the exponential utility. By solving the corresponding Fleming-Bellman-Isaacs equations, we derive the optimal reinsurance and investment strategies. Furthermore, numerical examples are presented to show our results.</abstract><cop>Cairo, Egypt</cop><pub>Hindawi Publishing Corporation</pub><doi>10.1155/2020/7265121</doi><tpages>19</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0187-6461</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3882-0971</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 1024-123X |
ispartof | Mathematical problems in engineering, 2020, Vol.2020 (2020), p.1-19 |
issn | 1024-123X 1563-5147 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2397477660 |
source | Wiley-Blackwell Open Access Collection; Publicly Available Content Database (Proquest) (PQ_SDU_P3) |
subjects | Brownian motion Differential games Engineering Expected utility Game theory Insurance Insurance companies Investment strategy Risk exposure Volatility |
title | Optimal Reinsurance-Investment Problem under a CEV Model: Stochastic Differential Game Formulation |
url | http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-07T23%3A56%3A40IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Optimal%20Reinsurance-Investment%20Problem%20under%20a%20CEV%20Model:%20Stochastic%20Differential%20Game%20Formulation&rft.jtitle=Mathematical%20problems%20in%20engineering&rft.au=Li,%20Danping&rft.date=2020&rft.volume=2020&rft.issue=2020&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=19&rft.pages=1-19&rft.issn=1024-123X&rft.eissn=1563-5147&rft_id=info:doi/10.1155/2020/7265121&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2397477660%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-883c862651af4a6981bbc0a5cc00d0c2262f3f12c589fba85304bec467fab6a63%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2397477660&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |