Anthropic Concepts

Natural kind concepts have the function of tracking categories that exist independently of our beliefs and purposes. But not all ways of tracking categories in the natural world involve conceiving of them as natural kinds. Anthropic concepts represent groups of natural, mind‐independent entities tha...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Noûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Indiana), 2020-06, Vol.54 (2), p.451-468
Main Author: Weiskopf, Daniel A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Belief & doubt
Cross cultural studies
Ecology
Knowledge
Nature
Realism
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Summary:Natural kind concepts have the function of tracking categories that exist independently of our beliefs and purposes. But not all ways of tracking categories in the natural world involve conceiving of them as natural kinds. Anthropic concepts represent groups of natural, mind‐independent entities that are apt for serving various human interests, goals, and projects. They represent the natural world under a practical mode of presentation, as a set of material resources that can be transformed to further a host of functions and ends. I argue that cross‐cultural studies of traditional ecological knowledge provide evidence that many chemical, mineral, and biological concepts that are frequently taken to be natural kind concepts turn out on closer inspection to be anthropic concepts. Anthropic concepts are distinguished from artifact concepts, and a form of realism about the anthropic kinds that they refer to is defended.
ISSN:0029-4624
1468-0068
DOI:10.1111/nous.12255