The Political-Economic Foundations of Representative Government

The dominant interpretation of the Glorious Revolution portrays it as an innovative compromise that used clever institutional design to solve a coordination problem between rival elites. In contrast, I argue that it was neither innovative nor a compromise and that it was the product of structural ch...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Perspectives on politics 2020-06, Vol.18 (2), p.454-469
Main Author: Narizny, Kevin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
17th century
Allegiance
Authoritarianism
Capitalism
Civil war
Coalitions
Compromises
Constituents
Constitutional law
Cooperation
Coordination
Democracy
Elites
Equilibrium
Legislatures
Markets
Medieval period
Political systems
Politics
Rent-seeking
Rule of law
Structural change
Taxation
Theory
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:The dominant interpretation of the Glorious Revolution portrays it as an innovative compromise that used clever institutional design to solve a coordination problem between rival elites. In contrast, I argue that it was neither innovative nor a compromise and that it was the product of structural change rather than institutional design. Following Barrington Moore, I focus on the rise of agrarian capitalism and economically autonomous elites, who, in contrast to rent-seeking elites, do not depend on favor from the state for their income. They have an interest in the creation of a political system that ensures their equal rights under the law, open access to markets, and opportunities to form broad coalitions against rent-seeking. This makes them a critical constituency for representative government. I test this argument through an analysis of patterns of allegiance for Crown and Parliament at the outset of the English Civil War and address its relevance to the Glorious Revolution.
ISSN:1537-5927
1541-0986
DOI:10.1017/S1537592719002548